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Abstract
In this paper we present a sufficient condition for the existence of a solution for an equilibrium problem
on an Hadamard manifold and under suitable assumptions on the sectional curvature, we propose a
framework for the convergence analysis of a proximal point algorithm to solve this equilibrium problem
in finite time. Finally we offer an application to personal equilibrum problems as behavioral traps
problems, using a recent “variational rationality” approach of human behavior.
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1 Introduction
The equilibrium problem EP has been widely studied and is a very active field of research. One of the mo-
tivations is that various problems may be formulated as an equilibrium problem, for instance, optimization
problems, Nash equilibria problems, complementarity problems, fixed point problems and variational in-
equality problems. An extensive development can be found in Blum and Oettli [1], Bianchi and Schaible [2]
and their references.
An important issue is under what conditions there exists a solution to EP. In the linear setting, several
authors have provided results answering this question; see, for instance, Ky Fan [3], Bre´zis et al. [4], Iusem
and Sosa [5] and Iusem et al. [6]. As far as we know, Colao et al. [7] were the first to provide an existence
result for equilibrium problems in a Riemannian context, more accurately, on Hadamard manifolds, in the
case where EP is associated to a monotone bifunction which satisfies a certain coercivity condition. On this
issue, following the ideas presented in [6], we have presented a weaker sufficient condition than the coercivity
assumption used in [7], to obtain the existence of solutions of EP.
Recently, in [7] the authors presented an iterative process, Picard iteration, to approximate a solution of
the equilibrium problem on an Hadamard manifold which retrieves the proximal iteration of the proximal
point method studied, for example, by Moudafi [8], Konnov [9] and Iusem and Sosa [10], both in the linear
setting. In this paper, we present a proximal algorithm for EP on an Hadamard manifold with null sectional
curvature whose iterative process coincides with the proposed in [7, Theorem 4.10]. We point out that our
contribution here is an extension of the convergence result presented in [7] to the case where the bifunction
of EP is not necessarily monotone. Note that, under assumption of null sectional curvature, our algorithm
retrieves the proximal point method for the variational inequalities problem presented by Tang et al. [11]
and, hence, the proximal point method for minimization problems (see Ferreira and Oliveira [12]) or, more
generally, the proximal point method for vector fields, both on Hadamard manifolds, see Li et al. [13]. In
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recent years, extensions to Riemannian manifolds of concepts and techniques which fit in Euclidean spaces
are natural. Some algorithms for solving variational inequalities and minimization problems which involve
monotone operators have been extended from Hilbert space framework to more general setting of Riemannian
manifolds; see Ferreira et al. [14], [12], Li et al. [15] and Wang et al. [16]. One reason for the success of
techniques extension to the Riemannian setting is the possibility to transform nonconvex problems in linear
context in convex problems by introducing a suitable metric; see Cruz Neto et al. [17] and Rapcsa´k [18].
In regard to the minimization problem where the constrained set is the whole manifold, Bento and Cruz
Neto in [19] showed that the proximal point method has finite termination in the particular case where the
objective function is convex and each minimizer is a weak sharp minimum (see Li et al. [20] for a definition).
Following the ideas presented by Moudafi in [21], we present a condition about the bifunction F that, in
particular, retrieves the notion of weak sharp minima, and we prove the finite termination of any sequence
generated from our iterative process. In particular, the finite termination result in [19] is extended to
minimization problems whose constrained set is not necessarily the whole manifold and we obtain a resulted
of finite convergence to the proximal point methods for finding singularities of single valued monotone vector
fields (see, for instance [13] and Cruz Neto et al. [22]) and, hence, for the variational inequality problem (see
Ne´meth [23]) among others.
The organization of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give some elementary facts on Riemannian
manifolds and convexity needed for reading of this paper. In Section 3, we present a sufficient condition
for existence of a solution for the equilibrium problem on Hadamard manifolds under similar conditions
required in the linear case. In Section 4, the proximal point algorithm for equilibrium problems on Hadamard
manifolds is presented, convergence analysis is derived and, under mild assumption, a finite termination result
is proved. In Section 5, we give a behavioral application to the so called personal equilibrium problems where
agents have reference dependent utility functions and variable reference points (see, Ko˝szegi and Rabin [24]),
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in the context of a recent and unifying approach of a lot of stability and change dynamics in Behavioral
Sciences, the “Variational rationality” approach of worthwhile stays and changes human behavior (see,
Soubeyran [25, 26]). This approach focus the attention on three main concepts:
i) worthwhile single changes, where, for an isolated agent or several interrelated agents, their motivation
to change from the current position to a new position is higher than some adaptive and satisficing
worthwhile to change ratio, time their resistance to change. Motivation to change refers to the utility
of advantages to change, while resistance to change refers to the disutility of inconvenients to change.
Resistance to change includes inertia, frictions, obstacles, difficulties to change, costs to be able to
change and inconvenient to change;
ii) worthwhile transitions, i.e, succession of worthwhile single stays and changes;
iii) traps, which can be stationary or variational. A trap is stationary when, starting for it, no feasible
change is worthwhile. An equilibrium appears to be a very particular stationary trap, in a world
with no resistance to change, when only motivation to change matters. In this case the agent has
no motivation to change (no advantage to change, i.e only losses to change), and zero resistance to
change. A trap is variational with respect to a subset of initial positions, when it is stationary, and,
starting from any of these initial positions, agents can find a succession of worthwhile single changes
and temporary stays which converge to this stationary trap. Then, a variational trap is rather easy to
reach and difficult to leave in a worthwhile way. Furthermore, traps can be weak or strong, depending
of large or strict inequalities.
This last section, devoted to applications, focus the attention on a succession of worthwhile changes and stays,
moving from a weak stationary trap to a new one, given that the agent can change, each step, his satisficing
worthwhile to change ratio. The approximation process presented in [7] represents a nice instance of such a
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worthwhile stability and change dynamic. The result of this paper shows that this dynamic converges to an
equilibrium (a personal equilibrium for personal equilibrium problems), which is supposed, a priori, to be
a weak variational trap. This last hypothesis is the essence, in the variational rationality approach, of the
so called famous weak sharp minimum condition. It allows convergence in finite time. Because, in the long
run, we are dead, finite convergence to a trap is a fundamental property of any human behavior (defined as
a sequence of actions). This worthwhile stability and change dynamic is a very important benchmark case
of the more general stability and change dynamic (see [25, 26]), where a succession of worthwhile changes
move from a position to a new one (which are not supposed to be stationary traps) and converges to an
end point, which is shown to be a variational trap (this is not an hypothesis). Finally, Section 6 contains
concluding discussions of the main results obtained in the paper.
2 Preliminary
2.1 Riemanian Geometry
In this section, we recall some fundamental and basic concepts needed for reading this paper. These results
and concepts can be found in the books on Riemannian geometry, see do Carmo [27] and Sakay [28].
Let M be a n-dimensional connected manifold. We denote by TxM the n-dimensional tangent space of
M at x, by TM = ∪x∈MTxM the tangent bundle of M and by X (M) the space of smooth vector fields over
M . When M is endowed with a Riemannian metric 〈. , .〉, with the corresponding norm denoted by ‖.‖, then
M is a Riemannian manifold. Recall that the metric can be used to define the length of piecewise smooth
curves γ : [a, b] → M joining x to y, i.e., γ(a) = x and γ(b) = y, by l(γ) :=
∫ b
a
‖γ′(t)‖dt, and moreover, by
minimizing this length functional over the set of all such curves, we obtain a Riemannian distance d(x, y)
inducing the original topology on M . We denote by B(x, ǫ) the Riemannian ball on M with center x and
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radius ǫ > 0. A vector field V along γ is said to be parallel iff ∇γ′V = 0. If γ′ itself is parallel we say that γ
is a geodesic. Given that the geodesic equation ∇ γ′γ′ = 0 is a second-order nonlinear ordinary differential
equation, we conclude that the geodesic γ = γv(., x) is determined by its position x and velocity v at x. It is
easy to verify that ‖γ′‖ is constant. We say that γ is normalized iff ‖γ′‖ = 1. The restriction of a geodesic
to a closed bounded interval is called a geodesic segment. Given points x, y ∈ M , we denote the geodesic
segment from x to y by [x, y]. We usually do not distinguish between a geodesic and its geodesic segment,
as no confusion can arise. A geodesic segment joining x to y in M is said to be minimal iff its length equals
d(x, y) and the geodesic in question is said to be a minimizing geodesic.
A Riemannian manifold is complete iff the geodesics are defined for any values of t. The Hopf-Rinow’s
Theorem ([27, Theorem 2.8, page 146] or [28, Theorem 1.1, page 84]) asserts that, if this is the case, then
any pair of points in M can be joined by a (not necessarily unique) minimal geodesic segment. Moreover,
(M,d) is a complete metric space and, bounded and closed subsets are compact. From the completeness of
the Riemannian manifold M , the exponential map expx : TxM → M is defined by expx v = γv(1, x), for
each x ∈M . A complete simply-connected Riemannian manifold of nonpositive sectional curvature is called
an Hadamard manifold. It is known that if M is a Hadamard manifold, then M has the same topology and
differential structure as the Euclidean space Rn; see, for instance, [27, Lemma 3.2, page 149] or [28, Theorem
4.1, page 221]. Furthermore, are known some similar geometrical properties to the existing in Euclidean
space Rn, such as, given two points there exists an unique geodesic segment that joins them. Now, we
present a geometric property which will be very useful in the convergence analysis.
Let us recall that a geodesic triangle ∆(x1x2x3) of a Riemannian manifold is the set consisting of three
distinct points x1,x2 ,x3 called the vertices and three minimizing geodesic segments γi+1 joining xi+1 to
xi+2 called the sides , where i = 1, 2, 3(mod 3).
Theorem 2.1. Let M be a Hadamard manifold, ∆(x1x2x3) a geodesic triangle and γi+1 : [0, li+1] → M
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geodesic segments joining xi+1 to xi+2 and set li+1 := l(γi+1), θi+1 =<)
(
γ′i+1(0), −γ
′
i(li)
)
, for i = 1, 2, 3
(mod 3). Then,
θ1 + θ2 + θ3 6 π
l2i+1 + l
2
i+2 − 2li+1li+2cosθi+2 6 l
2
i ,
d2(xi+1, xi+2) + d
2(xi+2, xi)− 2〈exp
−1
xi+2
xi+1, exp
−1
xi+2
xi〉 ≤ d
2(xi, xi+1). (2.1)
Proof. See, for example, [28, Theorem 4.2, page 161].
As mentioned in [7] (see Bridson and Haefliger [29]), it follows that:
d2(x, y) ≤ 〈exp−1x z, exp
−1
x y〉+ 〈exp
−1
y z, exp
−1
y x〉, x, y, z ∈M. (2.2)
In this paper, all manifolds M are assumed to be Hadamard and finite dimensional.
2.2 Convexity
A set Ω ⊂ M is said to be convex iff any geodesic segment with end points in Ω is contained in Ω, that is,
iff γ : [a, b] → M is a geodesic such that x = γ(a) ∈ Ω and y = γ(b) ∈ Ω, then γ((1 − t)a + tb) ∈ Ω for all
t ∈ [0, 1]. Given B ⊂ M , we denote by conv(B) the convex hull of B, that is, the smallest convex subset of
M containing B. Let Ω ⊂M be a convex set. A function f : Ω→ R is said to be convex iff for any geodesic
segment γ : [a, b]→ Ω the composition f ◦ γ : [a, b]→ R is convex. Take p ∈ Ω. A vector s ∈ TpM is said to
be a subgradient of f at p iff
f(q) ≥ f(p) + 〈s, exp−1p q〉, q ∈ Ω. (2.3)
The set of all subgradients of f at p, denoted by ∂f(p), is called the subdifferential of f at p. It is known
that if f is convex and M is an Hadamard manifold, then ∂f(p) is a nonempty set, for each p ∈ Ω; see
Udriste [30, Theorem 4.5, page 74].
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Let B ⊂M be a non-empty, convex and closed set. The distance function associated with B is given by
M ∋ x 7−→ dB(x) := inf{d(y, x) : y ∈ B} ∈ R+.
It is well-known (see [12, Corollary 3.1]) that for each x ∈M there exists a unique element x˜ ∈ B such that
〈exp−1x˜ x, exp
−1
x˜ y〉 ≤ 0, y ∈ B.
In this case, x˜ is the projection of x onto the set B which we will denote by PB(x).
Remark 2.1. It is important to mention that for every y ∈ M , x 7→ d(x, y) is a continuous and convex
function, see [28, Proposition 4.3, page 222].
3 Equilibrium Problem
In this section, following the ideas shown in [6], we present a sufficient condition for the existence of solution
of equilibrium problems on Hadamard manifolds. We chose to present a proof only for the main result. With
the exception to the proof of Proposition 3.1, the proof of the other results can be extended, from those
presented in linear environments (see [6, 5]), with minor adjustments to the nonlinear context of this paper.
From now on, Ω ⊂M will denote a nonempty closed convex set, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Given
a bifunction F : Ω × Ω → R satisfying the property F (x, x) = 0, for all x ∈ Ω, the equilibrium problem in
the Riemannian context (denoted by EP) consists in:
Find x∗ ∈ Ω : F (x∗, y) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Ω. (3.1)
In this case, the bifunction F is called an equilibrium bifunction. As far as we know, this problem was
considered firstly, in this context in [7], where the authors pointed out important problems, which are
retrieved from (3.1). Particularly, given V ∈ X (M), if
F (x, y) = 〈V (x), exp−1x y〉, ∀ x, y ∈ Ω, (3.2)
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(3.1) reduces to the variational inequality problem; see, for instance [23].
Remark 3.1. Although the Variational Inequality Theory provides us a toll for formulating a variety of
equilibrium problems, Iusem and Sosa [5, Proposition 2.6] showed that the generalization given by EP
formulation with respect to VIP (Variational Inequality Problem) is genuina, in the sense that there are EP
problems which do not fit the format of VIP. We affirm that is possible to guarantee the genuineness given by
EP formulation compared to VIP, by considering the important class given by Quasi-Convex Optimization
Problems that appear, for instance, in many micro-economical models devoted to maximize utilities. Indeed,
the absence of convexity allows us to obtain situations where this important class of problems can not be
considered as a VIP in the sense that their possible representation in this format would lead us to a problem,
whose solution set contains points that do not necessarily belong to the solution set of the original optimization
problem. On the other hand even in the absence of convexity, this class of problems can be placed on the EP
format.
Definition 3.1. Let F : Ω× Ω→ R be a bifunction. F is said to be
(1) monotone iff F (x, y) + F (y, x) ≤ 0, for all (x, y) ∈ Ω× Ω;
(2) pseudomonotone iff, for each (x, y) ∈ Ω× Ω, F (x, y) ≥ 0 implies F (y, x) ≤ 0;
(3) θ-undermonotone iff, there exists θ ≥ 0 such that, F (x, y) +F (y, x) ≤ θd2(x, y), for all (x, y) ∈ Ω×Ω.
Remark 3.2.
i) Clearly, monotonicity implies pseudomonotonicity, but the converse does not hold even in a linear
context, see, for instance, Iusem and Sosa [5].
ii) If F is pseudomonotone and, for x˜, y˜ ∈ Ω, F (x˜, y˜) > 0 implies F (y˜, x˜) < 0. Indeed, let us suppose,
for contradiction, that F (y˜, x˜) = 0 (in particular F (y˜, x˜) ≥ 0). From the pseudomonotonicity of F it
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follows that F (x˜, y˜) ≤ 0, which is an absurdity, and the affirmation is proved.
Next result was presented by Colao et al. in [7] and is fundamental to establish our existence result for
the EP.
Proposition 3.1. Let B ⊂ M be a closed convex subset and H : B → 2B be a mapping such that, for each
y ∈ B, H(y) is closed. Suppose that
(i) there exists y0 ∈ B such that H(y0) is compact;
(ii) ∀y1, . . . , ym ∈ B, conv({y1, . . . , ym}) ⊂
⋃m
i=1H(yi).
Then, ⋂
y∈B
H(y) 6= ∅.
Proof. See [7].
Unless stated to the contrary, in the remainder of this paper we assume that F : Ω×Ω→ R is a bifuntion
satisfying the following assumptions:
H1) F (x, x) = 0 for each x ∈ Ω;
H2) For every x ∈ Ω, y 7→ F (x, y) is convex and lower semicontinuous;
H3) For every y ∈ Ω, x 7→ F (x, y) is upper semicontinuous.
For each y ∈ Ω, let us define:
LF (y) := {x ∈ Ω : F (y, x) ≤ 0}.
From this set, we can consider the following convex feasibility problem (denoted by CFP):
Find x∗ ∈
⋂
y∈Ω
LF (y).
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As far as we know, this problem was first studied, in the Riemannian context, by Bento and Melo in [31],
in the particular case where the domain of F is M × {1, . . . ,m}. In this case, y ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and Ω is the
whole M.
Next result establishes a relationship between CFP and EP.
Lemma 3.1. The solution set of CFP is contained in the solution set of EP.
Remark 3.3. Note that, as it is in the Euclidean context, the equality between the sets in the previous
lemma in general does not happens, see [5]. However, in the particular case where F is pseudomonotone,
the equality is immediately verified.
Take z0 ∈M fixed. For each k ∈ N consider the following set:
Ωk := {x ∈ Ω : d(x, z0) ≤ k}.
Note that Ωk is a nonempty set, for k ∈ N sufficiently large. For simplicity, we can suppose, without loss
of generality, that Ωk is a nonempty set for all k ∈ N. Moreover, as Ωk is contained in the closed ball
B(z0, k) := {x ∈ M : d(z0, x) ≤ k}, it is a bounded set. On the other hand, since d(·, z0) is a continuous
and convex function (this follows from Remark 2.1), Ωk is a convex and closed set and, hence, compact (see
the Ropf-Rinow’s Theorem). We denote, by Ω0k, the following set:
Ω0k := {x ∈ Ω : d(x, z0) < k}.
For each y ∈ Ω, let us define:
LF (k, y) := {x ∈ Ωk : F (y, x) ≤ 0}.
Lemma 3.2. Let k ∈ N, x¯ ∈
⋂
y∈Ωk
LF (k, y) and assume that there exists y¯ ∈ Ω0k such that F (x¯, y¯) ≤ 0.
Then, F (x¯, y) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ Ω, i.e., x¯ is a solution for (3.1).
11
Assumption 3.1. Given k ∈ N, for all finite set {y1, . . . , ym} ⊂ Ωk, one has
conv({y1, . . . , ym}) ⊂
m⋃
i=1
LF (k, yi).
Remark 3.4. Note that, in the particular case where F is pseudomonotone, the property described by the
previous assumption is naturally verified. Indeed, let y1, . . . , ym ∈ Ωk, take y¯ ∈ conv({y1, . . . , yn}) and let us
suppose, for contradiction, that y¯ /∈
⋃m
i=1 LF (k, yi). Then,
F (yi, y¯) > 0, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (3.3)
Now, define the following set B := {x ∈ Ωk : F (y¯, x) < 0}. In the particular case where F is pseudomonotone,
using (3.3) and taking into account that B is convex (this follows from H2), we conclude that y¯ ∈ B (see
item ii) of Remark 3.2). But this contradicts H1 and the affirmation is proved.
Assumption 3.2. Given z0 ∈ M fixed, consider a sequence {zk} ⊂ Ω such that {d(zk, z0)} converges to
infinity as k goes to infinity. Then, there exists x∗ ∈ Ω and k0 ∈ N such that
F (zk, x∗) ≤ 0, k ≥ k0.
It is worth noting that this last assumption has been presented by Iusem et al. [6], in a space with a
linear structure. It is a sufficient condition for the existence of solutions of the equilibrium problem EP.
Next result (see [5] for similar results, in the linear setting) assure us that Assumption 3.2 is a weaker
sufficient condition than the coercivity assumption used by Colao et al. [7], for the existence of solutions of
EP.
Proposition 3.2. Let B ⊂ M be a compact set and y0 ∈ B ∩ Ω a point such that F (x, y0) < 0, for all
x ∈ Ω \ B. Then, F satisfies Assumption 3.2.
The following is the main result of this section.
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Theorem 3.1. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, EP admits a solution.
Proof. Recall that Ωk is a convex and compact set for each k ∈ N. Now, given k ∈ N and y ∈ Ω, note that
LF (k, y) is a compact set. Indeed, this fact follows from the definition of LF (k, y) combined with assumption
H2 (F (y, ·) is a lower semicontinuous function on Ω) and compactness of Ωk. Now, since Assumption 3.1
holds true, using Proposition 3.1 with B = Ωk and H(y) = LF (k, y), we conclude that, for each k ∈ N,
⋂
y∈Ωk
LF (k, y) 6= ∅.
For each k, choose zk ∈
⋂
y∈Ωk
LF (k, y) and take z0 ∈M fixed. If there exists k ∈ N such that d(zk, z0) < k,
then zk ∈ Ω0k and, from Lemma 3.2, it follows that z
k solves EP. On the other hand, if d(zk, z0) = k, from
Assumption 3.2, there exists, x∗ ∈ Ω and k0 ∈ N such that F (zk, x∗) ≤ 0, for all k ≥ k0. Taking k′ > k0 such
that d(x∗, z0) < k
′, we have F (zk
′
, x∗) ≤ 0 and x∗ ∈ Ω0k′ . Therefore, using again Lemma 3.2, we conclude
that zk
′
solves EP, and the proof is complete.
Next example was inspired by [7, Example 3.4]. It illustrates the usefulness of the our previous result, in
the sense that it applies to some situations not covered in the linear setting. For other papers that highlight
such advantage, in regard to the linear setting, see [22, 31].
Example 3.1. Let Ω = {(x, y, z) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, y2 − z2 = −1, y ≥ 0, z ≥ 1} ⊂ R × H1 and consider the
following bifunction F : Ω× Ω→ R, given by:
F ((x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2)) := (2− x1)
((
y22 + z
2
2
)
−
(
y21 + z
2
1
))
.
Note that Ω is indeed a not convex set in R3. So, an equilibrium problem defined on Ω cannot be solved by
using the classical results known in the linear context. Let (Hn, 〈 , 〉) be the Riemannian manifold, where
H
n := {x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn+1) ∈ R
n+1 : xn+1 > 0 and 〈x, x〉 = −1} (hyperbolic n space),
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and 〈 , 〉 is the Riemannian metric 〈x, y〉 := x1y1+x2y2+ . . .+xnyn−xn+1yn+1 (Lorentz metric). As noted
in [7], (Hn, 〈 , 〉) is a Hadamard manifold with sectional curvature −1 and, given initial conditions x ∈ Hn,
v ∈ TxHn (‖v‖ = 1), the normalized geodesic γ : R→ Hn, is given by:
γ(t) = (cosh t)x+ (sinh t)v, t ∈ R.
Hence, we obtain the following expression for the Riemannian distance d:
d(x, y) = arccosh(−〈x, y〉), x, y ∈ Hn.
Again, as observed in [7], Ω is a convex set which is immersed in the Hadamard manifold M := R × H1.
Using the expression of the geodesic curves, it can be deduced that F is a convex function in the second
variable. Moreover, from the definition of F , it is easy to see that all the assumptions H1, H2 and H3 are
satisfied, and F is a pseudomonotone bifunction which is not monotone. In particular, from Remark 3.4, it
follows that Assumption 3.1 holds. Now, take w0 ∈ M fixed and a sequence {wk} ⊂ Ω, wk := (xk, yk, zk),
such that d(wk, w0) → +∞. There exists x∗ := (1, 0, 1) ∈ Ω such that F (wk, x∗) ≤ 0, for all k ∈ N, i.e.,
Assumption 3.2 holds. Therefore, Theorem 3.1 implies the existence of an equilibrium point for F .
4 Proximal Point for Equilibrium Problem
In this section and remainder of this paper, M will denote an Hadamard manifold with null sectional
curvature. Following some ideas presented in [10], we propose an approach of the proximal point algorithm
for equilibrium problems on Hadamard manifolds with null sectional curvature, where the convergence result
is obtained for bifunctions which are not necessarily monotone. This problem was proposed in [7] for the
case of an Hadamard manifold and under monotonocity of the equilibrium bifunction.
Let us denote the equilibrium point set of F by EP(F,Ω) and, for λ > 0 and z ∈ Ω fixed, consider the
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bifunction
Fλ,z(x, y) := F (x, y)− λ〈exp
−1
x z, exp
−1
x y〉, x, y ∈ Ω. (4.1)
Now, we describe a proximal point algorithm to solve the equilibrium problem (3.1).
Algorithm 1. Take {λk} a bounded sequence of positive real numbers.
1. Choose an initial point x0 ∈ Ω;
2. Given xk, if xk ∈ EP(F,Ω), STOP. Otherwise;
3. Given xk, take as the next iterate any xk+1 ∈ Ω such that:
xk+1 ∈ EP(Fk,Ω), Fk := Fλk,xk . (4.2)
Remark 4.1. It is worth noting that the iterative process (4.2) has appeared first in [7]. If V ∈ X (M), note
that, for F given as in (3.2), this iterative process retrieves the proximal point method for the variational
inequalities problem on Hadamard manifolds presented in [11]. In particular, the iterative process (4.2)
retrieves the proximal point method for minimization problems, see [12] or, more generally, the proximal
point for vector fields both on Hadamard manifolds, see [13].
Next results are useful to ensure the well-definition of Algorithm 1. In the remainder of this section, we
assume that λ is a positive real number and z ∈ Ω, both fixed.
Lemma 4.1. Let F be a θ-undermonotone bifunction with θ ≤ λ. Then, Fλ,z is monotone.
Proof. From (4.1), it is easy to see that
Fλ,z(x, y) + Fλ,z(y, x) = F (x, y) + F (y, x)− λ[〈exp
−1
x z, exp
−1
x y〉+ 〈exp
−1
y z, exp
−1
y x〉], x, y ∈ Ω.
So, taking into account that F is θ-undermonotone, the desired result follows by combining last equality
with (2.2) and assumption θ ≤ λ.
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Lemma 4.2. Fλ,z satisfies the assumption H2.
Proof. From the definition of Fλ,z in (4.1) and, taking into account that λ > 0 and F satisfies H1, to
prove this lemma it is sufficient to ensure that, Ω ∋ y 7−→ g(y) := −〈exp−1x z, exp
−1
x y〉 ∈ R is convex and
lower semicontinuous. For the convexity of g, see Cruz Neto et al. [32, Theorem 1]. Note that g is a lower
semicontinuous function, since g is a differentiable function.
Lemma 4.3. Let F be a θ-undermonotone bifunction with θ < λ. If F satisfies Assumption 3.2, then Fλ,z
also satisfies this assumption.
Proof. First of all, given z0 ∈ M , consider a sequence {zk} ⊂ Ω such that {d(zk, z0)} converges to infinity
as k goes to infinity. Using (4.1) with x = zk and y = z, we get
Fλ,z(z
k, z) = F (zk, z)− λ〈exp−1
zk
z, exp−1
zk
z〉,
= F (zk, z)− λd2(zk, z),
≤ −F (z, zk) + (θ − λ)d2(zk, z), (4.3)
where the last inequality follows from the θ-undermonotonicity of F . Let us show that Fλ,z(z
k, z) ≤ 0, for
all k ≥ k0. Define the function fz : Ω → R by fz(y) = F (z, y). Since M is an Hadamard manifold and
y 7→ F (z, y) is a convex function, there exists v′ ∈ ∂fz(x′). So, applying inequality (2.3) with f = fz, s = v′,
p = x′ and q = zk, we have
〈v′, exp−1x′ z
k〉 ≤ fz(z
k)− fz(x
′) = F (z, zk)− F (z, x′), k = 0, 1, . . . . (4.4)
From (4.4) and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
− F (z, zk) ≤ ‖v′‖d(zk, x′)− F (z, x′) ≤ ‖v′‖[d(zk, z) + d(z, x′)]− F (z, x′), k = 0, 1, . . . . (4.5)
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Using (4.3) and (4.5), we have
Fλ,z(z
k, z) ≤ ‖v′‖[d(zk, z) + d(z, x′)]− F (z, x′) + (θ − λ)d2(zk, z), k = 0, 1, . . .
= d(zk, z)[‖v′‖+ (θ − λ)d(zk, z)] + ‖v′‖d(z, x′)− F (z, x′), k = 0, 1, . . . . (4.6)
Now, taking into account that θ < λ and {d(zk, z0)} converges to infinity as k goes to infinity, letting k goes
to infinity, we obtain (θ − λ)d(zk, z) → −∞. Hence, the desired results follows from the inequality (4.6)
which concludes the proof.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that Assumption 3.2 holds and F is a θ-undermonotone bifunction with θ < λ.
Then, there exists an unique x¯∗ ∈ Ω such that
Fλ,z(x¯
∗, y) ≥ 0, y ∈ Ω.
Proof. From Lemma 4.1 it follows that Fλ,z is monotone and, in particular, pseudomotone (this follows
from Remarks 3.2). Moreover, Remark 3.4 implies that Fλ,z satisfies Assumption 3.1 and Lemma 4.2 (resp.
Lemma 4.3) tell us that Fλ,z satisfies H2 (resp. Assumption 3.2). Hence, from Theorem 3.1 there exists, a
point x¯∗1 ∈ Ω such that
Fλ,z(x¯
∗, y) ≥ 0, y ∈ Ω.
Let us suppose, by contradiction, that there exists x¯∗2 satisfying the last inequality. Then,
Fλ,z(x¯
∗
1, x¯
∗
2) = F (x¯
∗
1, x¯
∗
2)− λ〈exp
−1
x¯∗
1
z, exp−1x¯∗
1
x¯∗2〉 ≥ 0,
and
Fλ,z(x¯
∗
2, x¯
∗
1) = F (x¯
∗
2, x¯
∗
1)− λ〈exp
−1
x¯∗
2
z, exp−1x¯∗
2
x¯∗1〉 ≥ 0.
By summing the last two inequalities, we get
λ[〈exp−1x¯∗
1
z, exp−1x¯∗
1
x¯∗2〉+ 〈exp
−1
x¯∗
2
z, exp−1x¯∗
2
x¯∗1〉] ≤ F (x¯
∗
1, x¯
∗
2) + F (x¯
∗
2, x¯
∗
1) ≤ θd
2(x¯∗1, x¯
∗
2) < λd
2(x¯∗1, x¯
∗
2),
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which contradicts inequality (2.2) and the proof is concluded.
Corollary 4.1. Assume that Assumption 3.2 holds and F is a θ-undermonotone bifunction. If {λk} is a
bounded sequence of positive real numbers such that θ < λk, k ∈ N, then Algorithm 1 is well-defined.
Proof. It follows immediately from Theorem 4.1.
In the remainder of this paper we assume that the assumptions of the previous corollary hold and {xk}
is a sequence generated from Algorithm 1. Taking into account that if Algorithm 1 terminates after a finite
number of iterations, it terminates at an equilibrium point of F , from now on, we assume also that {xk} is
an infinite sequence.
4.1 Convergence Analysis
In this section we present the convergence of the sequence {xk}.
Proposition 4.1. Let F be a pseudomonotone bifunction. Then,
〈exp−1xk+1 x
k, exp−1xk+1 x
∗〉 ≤ 0, x∗ ∈ EP (F,Ω). (4.7)
Proof. From the definition of the iterate xk+1 and Fk in (4.2) combined with (4.1), we obtain
λk〈exp
−1
xk+1
xk, exp−1xk+1 y〉 ≤ F (x
k+1, y), y ∈ Ω.
Since F is pseudomonotone and EP (F,Ω) ⊂ Ω, the desired result follows from the last inequality.
Definition 4.1. A sequence {zk} in the complete metric space (M,d) is said to be Feje´r convergent to a
nonempty set S ⊂M iff for every z ∈ S,
d(zk+1, z) ≤ d(zk, z) k = 0, 1, . . . .
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The following result is well known and its proof is elementary.
Proposition 4.2. Let {zk} be a sequence in the complete metric space (M,d). If {zk} is Feje´r convergent
to a non-empty set S ⊂M , then {zk} is bounded. If, furthermore, an accumulation point z of {zk} belongs
to S, then lim
k→∞
zk = z.
Now, we present our main convergence result.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that F is pseudomonotone. The sequence {xk} converges to a point in EP(F, Ω).
Proof. Take x¯ ∈ EP(F,Ω). Using inequality (2.1) with xi = x¯, xi+1 = xk and xi+2 = xk+1, we obtain
d2(xk+1, x¯) + d2(xk+1, xk)− 2〈exp−1
xk+1
xk, exp−1
xk+1
x¯〉 ≤ d2(xk, x¯).
Since F is pseudomonotone and x∗ ∈ EP(F,Ω), combining inequality (4.7) with last inequality and taking
into account that d2(xk+1, xk) > 0, it follows that {xk} is Feje´r convergent to the set EP(F,Ω). So, applying
Proposition 4.2 with zk = xk, k ∈ N, and S = EP(F,Ω), we have that {xk} is a bounded sequence. In
particular, from the Hopf-Rinow Theorem, there exists a subsequence {xkj} of {xk} converging to some
point x∗. Besides, as {λk} also is a bounded sequence, without loss of generality we can suppose that {λkj}
is a subsequence of {λk} converging to some λ∗. Given y ∈ Ω and considering that the angle between the
vectors exp−1xkj+1
xkj , exp−1xkj+1
y is denoted by θkj =<)
(
exp−1xkj+1
xkj , exp−1xkj+1
y
)
, taking into account that
‖ exp−1x x˜‖ = d(x, x˜), for all x, x˜ ∈M , we obtain
〈exp−1xkj+1
xkj , exp−1xkj+1
y〉 = d(xkj+1, xkj )d(xkj+1, y) cos θkj , j ∈ N. (4.8)
Now, from the definition of xkj+1 in (4.2) combined with (4.1) and (4.8), we get
F (xkj+1, y)− λkjd(x
kj+1, xkj )d(xkj+1, y) cos θkj ≥ 0, j ∈ N. (4.9)
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Since F (· , y) is upper semicontinuous, {cos θkj} is bounded and {d(x
kj , xkj+1)} (resp. {λkj}) goes to zero
(resp. λ∗) as j goes to infinity, we have
F (x∗, y) ≥ limF (xkj+1, y) = lim
j→+∞
[F (xkj+1, y)− λk〈exp
−1
x
kj+1
xkj , exp−1
x
kj+1
y〉] ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from (4.9). Therefore, the desired result follows of the arbitrary of y ∈ Ω.
Following the notations presented in [7], let us consider, for each λ > 0 fixed, the following set-valued
operator JFλ :M → 2
Ω given by
JFλ (x) := {z ∈M : F (z, y)− λ〈exp
−1
z x, exp
−1
z y〉 ≥ 0, y ∈ Ω}. (4.10)
In the particular case where F is monotone, JFλ is a firmly nonexpansive operator, i.e., for any x, y ∈ Ω,
the function φ : [0, 1] → [0,∞], defined by φ(t) = d(γ1(t), γ2(t)), is nonincreasing, where γ1(t) and γ2(t)
denote the geodesics joining x to JFλ (x) and y to J
F
λ (y), respectively. The proof of convergence presented
in [7] is based exactly on this property. Now, we present an example just for illustrating that, as it is in
the Euclidean context, the assumed conditions in our convergence result are weak to ensure the mentioned
property. This is one of the reasons why, in the present paper, do not we followed the approach presented
in [7] to obtain Theorem 4.2.
Example 4.1. (see [10]) Let us consider M = R, Ω = [1/2, 1] and F : [1/2, 1]× [1/2, 1]→ R, given by:
F (x, y) = x(x − y).
It is easy to check that F is 1-undermonotone and pseudomonotone. Now, we show that the resolvent of the
bifunction F is not firmly nonexpansive. Take x0 = 1/2 and λ = 7. It follows that
JFλ (x
0) =
λ
λ− 1
x0 ∴ xk :=
(
JFλ (x
0)
)k
= min
{
1,
(
λ
λ− 1
)k
x0
}
.
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Hence, x1 = λ/2(λ − 1) = 7/12 and x2 = λ2/2(λ − 1)2 = 49/72. Now, denote T (x) = JFλ (x), x = x
0,
y = T (x) = x1 and T (y) = x2. So,
〈exp−1
T (x) T (y), exp
−1
T (x) x〉+ 〈exp
−1
T (y) T (x), exp
−1
T (y) y〉 = (x
2 − x1)(x0 − x1) + (x1 − x2)(x1 − x2),
= (x2 − x1)(x0 − 2x1 + x2),
=
1
2
(x2 − x1)
(
λ
λ− 1
− 1
)2
,
> 0.
Therefore, by [33, Proposition 5] the resolvent JFλ is not firmly nonexpansive.
4.2 Finite Termination
In this section, following the ideas presented in [21], we obtain an important result of finite termination for
any sequence generated from Algorithm 1.
Next definition was introduced in the context of Hilbert spaces, see [21].
Definition 4.2. A possibly non degenerated F is said to be ρ-conditioned if and only if there exist positive
numbers τ and ρ such that
− F (x, PS(x)) ≥ τdist
ρ(x, S), x ∈ Ω, (4.11)
where S = EP(F,Ω).
Note that, if F is degenerate, i.e., exists a function φ : Ω → R such that F (x, y) = φ(y) − φ(x), then
S = argminΩφ. In this particular case, if φ is convex and ρ = 1, Definition 4.2 reduces to
φ(x) ≥ φ(x¯) + αdS(x), x¯ ∈ S, x ∈ Ω. (4.12)
This notion has been introduced in [20], in the Riemannian context, and says that S is a weak sharp minima
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set for the minimization problem
min{φ(x) : x ∈ Ω}, (4.13)
with modulus α > 0.
Now, we present a finite convergence result for the sequence {xk}.
Theorem 4.3. Assume that S is a non-empty set, the inequality (4.11) holds with ρ ∈]0, 1] and the sequence
{xk} converges to x∗ ∈ S. Then, x∗ is reached in a finite number of iterations, i.e., there exists a number
k0 ∈ N such that
xk0 = x∗.
Proof. Assume that dist(xk+1, S) > 0 for all k ∈ N. From (4.11), we obtain
τdistρ(xk+1, S) ≤ −F (xk+1, PS(x
k+1)) ≤ −λk〈exp
−1
xk+1
xk, exp−1
xk+1
PS(x
k+1)〉 ≤ λ¯d(xk, xk+1)dist(xk+1, S),
for all k ∈ N and λ¯ = supk∈N{λk}. From the last inequality, we get
λ¯−1τdistρ−1(xk+1, S) ≤ d(xk, xk+1).
Since ρ− 1 ≤ 0 and dist(xk+1, S)→ 0, it follows that d(xk, xk+1)9 0, which contradicts the fact that {xk}
is a convergent sequence. Therefore, the result of the theorem is true.
Remark 4.2.
i) Note that the last theorem extend the finite termination result in [19] to minimization problems whose
constrained set is not necessarily whole manifold. This holds because the minimization problem, as
(4.13), can be formulated as an equilibrium problem where the bifunction, associated to this particular
problem, satisfies (4.11) with ρ = 1 ∈]0, 1], or equivalently, S = argminΩφ is a weak sharp minima
set for the minimization problem (4.13) (see (4.12)). For a characterization of the condition (4.12), in
the case of convex minimization problems on Hadamard manifolds, see [20].
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ii) In regards to other problems that may be interpreted as equilibrium problems, we emphasize that our
resulted of finite convergence can be applied for the proximal point methods to finding singularities of
single valued monotone vector fields (see [22]), multivalued monotone vector fields (see [13]) and, hence,
for the variational inequality problem (see [23]) among others, when the bifunction associated to each
of these problems satisfies (4.11) with ρ ∈]0, 1]. We intend, in future work, to identify the condition
(4.11) in each particular instance listed earlier, and to investigate possible characterizations.
In order to illustrate the result of Theorem 4.3, let us consider the elementary Example 4.1. In this case,
S = EP (F,Ω) = {1} and
F (xk+1, 1) = xk+1(1 − xk+1) = xk+1dist(xk+1, S) ≥
1
2
dist(xk+1, S),
where ρ = 1 and τ = 1/2. Therefore, the sequence {xk} converges to x∗ = 1 in a finite number of iterations.
5 Worthwhile Transitions to Variational Traps on an Hadamard
Manifold
In this section, devoted to applications, we consider stability and change dynamics. They are everywhere.
For example, among many others, habits and routines formation and break, and exploration-exploitation
stability/change issues (where exploration refers to discovery, search, innovation. . . ). A recent “variational
rationality” approach in Behavioral Sciences (see [25, 26]) modelized and unified a huge list of such stability
and change dynamics. It shows how a succession of worthwhile stays and changes can converge to a varia-
tional trap (to be defined below). In an important paper, Colao et al. [7] gives, first in a static framework,
and then using an approximation process, three applications of equilibrium problems (EP) on Hadamard
manifolds: mixed variational inequalities (MVI), fixed points (FP) of set valued mappings, and Nash equilib-
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rium (NE) in non cooperative games. In this last section related to applications, we show that their approach
represents a special, but very important benchmark case, of a worthwhile stability and change dynamic on an
Hadamard manifold. The Variational rationality (VR) approach (see [25, 26]) rests on three main concepts:
worthwhile single stays and changes, worthwhile transitions (defined as successions of worthwhile single stays
and changes), and stationary/variational traps. The plan of this section works as follows: We
1) start our application with a critic of a Nash equilbirium as a purely static concept, which have no real
existence in a dynamic setting. In contrast, we define, in an informal way, the concept of a variational
trap, which is both, i) a stationary trap (a stable position with respect to any worthwhile change), and
ii) a reachable position, starting from the initial position, following a worthwhile transition. Then, to
show the importance of this application, we give, among many other examples, a short list of traps
in Behavioral Sciences (Psychology, Economics, Management Sciences, Sociology, Political Sciences,
Game theory, Decision theory, Artificial Intelligence,. . . ) and Applied Mathematics;
2) show why the context of an Hadamard manifold is so important for the examination of stability and
change dynamics;
3) summarize the Variational rationality (VR) approach ([25, 26]) in the context of this paper, to be
able to define and modelize the three main (VR) concepts of worthwhile single stays and changes,
worthwhile transitions and stationary/variational traps in this context;
4) examine, in the Euclidian case, the variational trap problem, which refers to the possible convergence
of a succession of worthwhile single changes and stays, moving from a stationary trap to the next,
ending in a variational trap;
5) examine the variational trap problem in the case of an Hadamard manifold;
6) show the Variational rationality flavor of all the hypothesis done in this paper;
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7) Finally, we interpret exact and inexact solutions to the equilibrium problem in variational rationality
terms.
5.1 Critic of the Nash Equilibrium Static Concept in a Dynamic Setting
The Variational rationality (VR) approach (see [25, 26]) makes a critic of an optimum, and more generally
of a Nash equilibrium, as a purely static concept, a stability concept, where agents, being at equilibrium,
prefer to stay there than to move, while they do not know why they are there, by pure change, an event of
zero measure. . . . On the contrary, the (VR) approach urges to focus attention, for dynamical applications
in Behavioral Sciences, on traps, and more precisely variational traps. These variational traps satisfy two
conditions:
i) stability issue: they are stable with respect to worthwhile changes (stationary traps): being there,
at equilibrium, agents prefer to stay than to move because to stay is worthwhile and to move is not.
Nash equilibrium are also stable positions, not with respect to worthwhile changes, but with respect
to advantages to change (ignoring resistance to change, in a world without frictions). It is as if agents,
at the very beginning of the process, by luck, find them in the trap;
ii) reachability and desirability issues with respect to a given subset of initial positions: traps must be
also reachable and desirable to reach, following a succession of worthwhile single stays and changes (a
worthwhile transition), moving from the initial position to the trap. In this general case, the agent
is not in the trap at the beginning of the process, as a static equilibrium supposes. Then, the agent
prefers to move towards the trap than to stay, following a succession of worthwhile single stays and
changes.
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This shows that a Nash equilibrium is a very specific case of a variational trap, which is difficult to justify
in dynamic settings. A position can be stable, like a Nash equilibrium, but will have no practical sense if it
is not reachable from the initial position. In this case this is an empty concept.
5.2 Examples of Traps in Behavioral Sciences
In Behavioral Sciences, Alber and Heward in [34] noticed that “relatively simple response is necessary to
enter the trap, yet once entered, the trap cannot be resisted in creating general behavior changes”. Among
a huge list of traps, in a lot of different disciplines, let us give some of them:
A) In Psychology, Baer and Wolf in [35] seem to be the first to use the term behavioral trap in term
of the end of a reinforcement process, describing “how natural contingencies of reinforcement operate
to promote and maintain generalized behavior changes”. Much later, Plous in [36] defines traps as
more or less easy to fall into and more or less difficult to get out. He lists five main behavioral traps:
investment, deterioration, ignorance and collective traps. . . . Then, several authors emphasized, again,
that behavioral traps are the ends of reinforcement processes, see Stephen [37]. Also, Baumeister in [38],
and Baumeister and Heatherton in [39] consider ego depletion traps, due to fatigue costs, in the context
of self regulation failures. Cognitive and emotional traps refer to all-or-nothing thinking, labeling,
over generalization, mental filtering, discounting the positive, jumping to conclusions, magnification,
emotional reasoning, should and shouldn’t statements, and personalizing the blame . . . .
B) In Economics and Decision Sciences, traps refer to hidden biases and heuristics. For example anchoring,
status quo, sunk costs, confirming evidence, framing, estimation and forecasting traps, see Hammond
et al. [40]. Traps also represent habits and routines.
C) In Management Sciences, Levinthal and March in [41] define, at the organizational level, success and
26
failure traps, in the context of the so called “myopia of learning”effect.
D) In Development theory, poverty traps is a main issue. To explain their formation, Appadurai in [42]
defined aspiration traps which describe the inability to aspire of the poors, (see Heifetz and Minelli [43],
Ray [44]).
Traps refer to rather easy to reach (feasibility and desirability issues) and difficult to leave (stability
issue) positions. They generalize critical points, optima, Nash equilibria, fixed points, Pareto optima, and
mixed variational equilibria, as reachable, desirable and stable end points of a dynamical process. They can
represent habits, routines, rules, conventions,. . . .
5.3 Hadamard Manifolds. The Modelization of the Repeated Regeneration of
Resources.
A striking advantage to consider equilibrium problems on an Hadamard manifold is to allow to consider, each
period, repeated constraints, which balance the repeated depletion and regeneration of resources, helping to
modelize human behavior in a realistic dynamic setting. An important constraint, almost always neglected
in the economic literature, is that the agent must spend, and then, regenerate his depleted energy as time
evolves (see the Ego-depletion theory in Psychology, Baumeister in [38]). To satisfy their needs, agents must
spend effort and energy to gather means in order to be able to acquire (produce, buy, sell, eliminate, . . . )
final goods which will satisfy partially these needs. Then, each period, the lost energy must be recovered.
Consider an agent who performs, each period, a list of activities x = (xi, xj), where activities i ∈ I produce
daily vital energy for the agent (like eating, resting, holidays, sports, healthy activities, arts, . . . ), giving
further motivations to act, and activities j ∈ J consume energy (working, thinking, . . . ). Let ei+(x
i) ≥ 0
be the energy produced by doing action xi ∈ R and ej−(x
j) ≥ 0 be the energy consumed by doing action
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xj ∈ R. Then, the regeneration of vital energy imposes the constraint Σi∈Iei+(x
i) − Σj∈Je
j
−(x
j) = E > 0.
Production and consumption functions of energy can be increasing and convex (the more an agent carries
out an activity, the more he produces and consumes energy, at an increasing rate). In the quadratic case,
the expression Σi∈I(x
i)2 − Σj∈J (xj)2 = E > 0 defines an hyperboloid. A more realistic example can be
given where production functions of energy are increasing, concave, and consumption functions of energy
are increasing convex. More generally each activity can both consume and produce some energy.
5.4 The VR Approach. A Model for Worthwhile Changes and Variatonal Traps
It is time to define and modelize, right now, the three main (VR) concepts, worthwhile single changes and
stays, worthwhile transitions, and variational traps. The (VR) variational rationality approach [25, 26] ad-
vocates that agents are “variationally rational”. Following the famous Prospect theory with riskless choice in
Economics (Tversky and Kahneman [45]) this “variational rationality” approach considers that agents look
at changes, rather than at endowments, stocks and wealth to evaluate their current utility. Then, it goes a
step further, in a true dynamic context, where the past, the present and the future matter to determine a
behavior (a succession of actions). It emphasizes, first, that the main variational question is “should I stay,
should I go?”. Then, it advocates that, a lot of times, agents do not optimize (contrary to Kahneman and
Tversky [46], who suppose that they do). Instead it considers that agents can “muddle through” (see Lind-
boom [47] in Political Sciences), behave as bounded and procedural rational agents (Simon [48], in Economics
and Management), as well as “practical rational” agents (Bratman [49] in Philosophy, Wooldridge [50], in
Artificial Intelligence). To unify all these different points of view in a lot of different disciplines, the vari-
ational rationality approach considers that, each step of a behavioral process (defined as a succession of
actions), an agent tries to perform worthwhile changes or stays.
Let us summarize very succintly the main aspects of this recent “variational rationality” approach. For
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simplification, let us consider the case of an agent. For more complex situations and a lot of variants,
see [25, 26]. The case of a game with interrelated agents will be examined below, to compare our findings
with those of [7]. Given an agent and his current experience e ∈ E (which depends of the sequence of his
past actions including the last action z which has been done, his motivation to change Me(z, y) ∈ R from
repeating the old action z, to do a new action y, must be higher than a choosen and satisficing worthwhile
to change ratio λ > 0 time his resistance to change Re(z, y) ∈ R+. This ratio is adaptive. Then, the core
of this construction is the following “worthwhile to change or stay” inequality: if z is the last past action
which have been done and y is a new action planned to be done in a near future, it is worthwhile to change
(z y y) than to stay (z y z) iff Me(z, y) ≥ λRe(z, y) where:
- Me(z, y) = U [Ae(z, y)] is the utility or pleasure, U [Ae], of advantages to change rather than to stay,
Ae = Ae(z, y);
- Re(z, y) = D [Ie(z, y)] is the desutility or pain, D [Ie] , of the inconvenients to change Ie = Ie(z, y) ≥ 0.
The worthwhile to change rather than to stay payoff, at z, is ∆λ,e(z, y) =Me(z, y)− λRe(z, y) and the
worthwhile “change rather than to stay” set, at z is Wλ,e(z) = {y ∈ Ω,∆λ,e(z, y) ≥ 0}.
The goal of this variational approach is to examine the dynamics of a succession of worthwhile stays
and changes xk+1 ∈ Wλ
k+1,ek
(xk), λk+1 > 0, k ∈ N, where ek = E(Xk) ∈ E is the experience of the agent
at step k, which depends of the history of past actions Xk = (x0, x1, . . . , xk), as well as, in more complex
cases, the history of the actions of other agents and the environment. Each step, given the current action
xk, the agent chooses first a satisficing worthwhile to change ratio λk+1 > 0 (in order to consider a change
as worthwhile this step) and, then, tries to find a new worthwhile to change action xk+1 ∈ Wλ
k+1,ek
(xk),
which must belong to the worthwhile to change set.
The main questions are, depending on the evolving context (the given parameters, each step):
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i) does this process converges, where does it converges, what is the end (a variational trap where it is
worthwhile to stay than to move);
ii) what are the dynamical properties of the transition from the given initial point to the end: speed of
convergence, convergence in finite time, . . . ;
iii) how efficient is this process: does the end is a critical point, a local maximum or minimum, an
approximate equilibrium, an equilibrium . . . ?
Payoff functions. Let ge : M → R be a payoff function (performance, revenue, profit . . . ) to be
maximized and fe : M → R be a cost function, or an unsatisfied need function to be minimized, which,
both, will depend of the experience e ∈ E of the agent.
Advantages to changes. In the separable case, advantages to change are Ae(z, y) = ge(y) − ge(z) or
Ae(z, y) = fe(z)− fe(y). More generally the advantage to change function is a bifunction Ae :M ×M → R.
Costs to be able to change and costs to be able to stay. Given the experience e ∈ E, costs to
be able to change (moving from being able to repeat the last action z to be able to do a new action y) are
Ce(z, y). Costs to be able to stay at z ( i.e to repeat action z) are Ce(z, z) ≥ 0.
Inconvenients to change. Let Ie = Ie(z, y) = Ce(z, y)− Ce(z, z) ≥ 0 be the inconvenients to change
between repeating the same old action z, and doing a new action y. They represent, given the agent’s
experience e ∈ E, the difference between costs to be able to change Ce(z, y) and costs to be able to stay,
Ce(z, z) ≥ 0.
Stationary traps (strong and weak). Let λ∗ > 0 and e
∗ ∈ E be a given satisficing worthwhile to
change ratio and a given experience. Then, x∗ ∈ Ω is a strong stationary trap if
∆λ∗,e∗(x
∗, y) =Me∗(x
∗, y)− λ∗Re∗(x
∗, y) < 0, y 6= x∗.
This means that it is not worthwhile to move from x∗, i.e, the worthwhile to change set shrinks to a point,
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Wλ∗,e∗(x
∗) = {x∗}. This refers to a stability issue, which takes also care of some resistance to change at x∗.
Notice that a (strong) equilibrium x∗ ∈ Ω will not consider any resistance to change, and will refer to the
truncated condition not motivation to change condition Me∗(x∗, y) < 0, for all y 6= x∗. A weak stationary
trap is such that
∆λ∗,e∗(x
∗, y) =Me∗(x
∗, y)− λ∗Re∗(x
∗, y) ≤ 0, y ∈ Ω.
Variational traps. An action x∗ ∈ X is a strong (weak) variational trap with respect to an initial
action x0 if, starting from x0, it exists a succession of “changes and stays” x
k+1 ∈ Wλk+1,ek(x
k), k ∈ N,
defined by a convergent sequence of satisficing worthwhile to change ratio and experiences,
(λk+1, e
k)→ (λ∗, e
∗), k → +∞,
such that,
i) xk converges to this point x∗ (it is worthwhile to move to this trap x∗, starting from x0);
ii) x∗ ∈ Ω is a strong stationary trap, Wλ∗,e∗(x
∗) = {x∗} (weak stationary trap).
In general a variational trap will be relative to a source set, an initial subset of actions Ω0 ⊂M , instead
of a given initial action Ω0 = {x0} . This means that, the trap is worthwhile to reach, starting from any
point of the source set Ω0. Notice that the second condition ii) defines only a strong stationnary trap (a
stability issue, when inertia matters). The first condition tells us that it is worthwhile to move to this trap
x∗, starting from x0 (a feasible and acceptable reachability issue).
5.5 The Variational Trap Problem in the Euclidian Space
The variational trap problem refers to the possible convergence of a succession of worthwhile single stays
and changes, moving from a stationary trap to the next, ending in a variational trap.
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• Equilibrium problems and Variational rationality equilibrium problems. Consider the case
where the space of actions is the Euclidian manifoldM = Ω = Rn. The equilibrium problem (EP) given
in (3.1)) refers, in Mathematics, to costs and losses minimization. Given a differentiable bifunction
A : Ω×Ω→ R, the variational rationality equilibrium problem (VR-EP) refers, in Behavioral Sciences,
to gains and advantages to change maximization (see [25, 26]). It is: find x∗ ∈ Ω such that the possible
advantage to change A(x∗, y) be non positive, i.e, A(x∗, y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ Ω. When F = −A, the
(VR-EP) problem is equivalent to the (EP) equilibrium problem. For easier comparisons with [7], start
from the Mathematical equilibrium problem (EP). In this last section devoted to applications, losses
and advantages to change do not depend of experience, i.e, Fe(x, y) = F (x, y) and Ae(x, y) = A(x, y)
for all e ∈ E. The simplest separable and experience independent case, where
F (x∗, y) = f(y)− f(x∗) = g(x∗)− g(y) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ Ω,
defines a minimum x∗ ∈ Ω of the unsatisfied need function f , or a maximum of the payoff function g
over Ω.
• Changes. Let Ω be the space of actions and consider an agent who, each period, looks at three
consecutive actions, x, z, y ∈ Ω, where x and z represent past actions, the two last actions he has done,
and y is the future action he plans to do. Hence, in this specific context, before looking at doing the
future action y, the current experience of the agent is e = (x, z) ∈ Ω×Ω = E. If the agent plans to do
an action y which is less similar to the past action than the present action, we will suppose that his
costs to be able to do this new action y increases with respect to the cost he has spend to be able to
do the last past action z. In the opposite case this cost will be higher.
• Pleasure and Pain functions. In the specific context of this paper, the equilibrium problem (EP)
on an Hadamard manifold, identify pleasure (utility) to advantages to change, U [Ae] = Ae, and pain
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(desutility) to inconvenient to change, D [Ie] = Ie.
• Advantages to changes. They are modelized as the bifunction A : M ×M → R. It is a constant
function which does not depend of experience e ∈ E.
• Losses to change. They refer to the bifunction F :M ×M → R, where F (z, y) = −A(z, y).
• Costs to be able to change and costs to be able to stay. They are Ce(z, y) ≥ 0 and Ce(z, z) ≥ 0.
Notice that costs to be able to stay are not necessary zero.
• Inconvenients to change as Tikhonov regularization terms. In the context of this paper, we
modelize inconvenients to change Ie(z, y) = Ce(z, y)− Ce(z, z) ≶ 0 as a Tikhonov perturbation term,
given by Ie(z, y) = 〈z−x, y−z〉, where the experience e = (x, z) of the agent concerns only his last two
past actions, x and z (both have been done) It turns out that, in Behavioral Sciences, it is identical
to the “Cosinus similarity” index, which is a measure of similarity between the two vectors u = z − x,
and y − z , where v = z − x represents the present change in past experience, and y − z the future
change. As a scalar product, it is equal, up to the sign (+, or -), to the distance d(x, z) between x and
z, time the distance d(z, yp) between z and the projection yp of y on the lign L(u) supported by the
vector u = z − x, i.e, Ie(z, y) = d(x, z)× d(z, yp) ≥ 0 if yp is outside the segment [z′, x, z′′] on the lign
L(d), i.e.,
yp < −−−−− z = z
′ < −−−−−− x−−−−− > z = z′′ −−−−−− > yp
and, Ie(z, y) = −d(x, z)× d(z, yp) ≤ 0 if yp is inside the segment [z′, x, z′′] on the lign L(d), i.e.,
z = z′ < −−−−− yp < −−−−−− x−−−−− > yp −−−−−− > z = z
′′
The interpretation is clear: having in mind that, x = two periods less recent past action, z = one
period most recent past action, and y = one period future action, the costs to be able to change rather
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than to stay increase (decrease) if the dissimilarity between the future action y and the second past
action x is higher (lower) than the dissimilarity between the last past action z and the past action x.
This index shows in a striking way how past experience matters much to determine future costs to be
able to change.
• Worthwhile changes. Let ∆λ,e(z, y) = A(z, y)−ξIe(z, y) =− [F (z, y) + λIe(z, y)] be the “worthwhile
to change rather than to stay” payoff of the agent. In this paper, when F (z, y) = −A(z, y), M = Rn
and Ie(z, y) = 〈z − x, y − z〉, λ > 0 is a satisficing worthwhile to change ratio, and e = (x, z) ∈ E
modelizes experience (the sequence of two actions he has done before, including the current action,
done just before). The present paper considers the specific case of short memory, where the agent
“remembers” only his two last past actions x, z. A change from the last past action z (yet done) to
the new action y (to be done), is worthwhile if ∆λ,e(z, y) ≥ 0. This means that advantages to change
A(z, y) from z to y are higher than λ > 0 times the experience dependent inconvenients to change
Ie(z, y), i.e, A(z, y) ≥ λIe(z, y) which is equivalent to a non negative sum of losses to change plus the
inconvenients to change, F (z, y) + λIe(z, y) ≥ 0.
• Successions of worthwhile changes. At period k, the two last past actions and future actions are
x = xk−1, z = xk and y = xk+1. Then, a change from z = xk to y = xk+1 is worthwhile if:
∆λk+1,ek(x
k, xk+1) = A(xk, xk+1)− λk+1Iek (x
k, xk+1) ≥ 0.
A succession
{
xk
}
of worthwhile single stays and changes satisfies ∆λk+1,ek(x
k, xk+1) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N.
To fit with the mathematics, we can note λk > 0 instead of λk+1 > 0. In the second mathematical case
λk > 0 is given, and refers to an heritage from the past and current situations; In the first behavioral
case, the satisficing worthwhile to change ratio λk+1 > 0 is chosen, and refers to a future change from
z = xk and y = xk+1.
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• Stationary trap (strong and weak). A strong (resp. weak) stationary trap x∗ ∈ Ω is such that,
starting from x∗, there is no available worthwhile change to be done:
∆λ∗,e∗(x
∗, y) = A(x∗, y)− λ∗Ie∗(x
∗, y) < 0, y 6= x∗, (resp. ∆λ∗,e∗(x
∗, y) ≤ 0, y ∈ Ω).
• Resolvents as subsets of weak stationary traps. Let us consider the following set:
JAλ (x) := {z ∈ Ω : A(z, y) ≤ λIe(z, y), ∀y ∈ Ω} ,
which is a variational rationality representation of resolvent of F defined in (4.10). They represent the
set of weak stationary traps related to experience e = (x, z) := (z − x) ∈ E.
Lemma 5.1 (Resolvent Lemma). . If z ∈ JFλ (x) and if advantages to changes are monotone, i.e,
(A(y, z) + A(z, y) ≥ 0 for all y, z ∈ Ω), then, it is worthwhile to change from x to z, i.e, z ∈ Wλ,e(x)
where e refers to z − x.
Proof. Take y = x. From e = z − x and Ie(z, y) = 〈e, y − z〉, we get
Ie(z, x) = 〈z − x, x− z〉 = −‖z − x‖
2
= −Ie(x, z).
Hence, taking into account that z ∈ JFλ (x), 〈exp
−1
z x, exp
−1
z x〉 = 〈z − x, z− x〉, A = −F and given the
monotonicity of A, we have
A(x, z) ≥ −A(z, x) = F (z, x) ≥ λIe(z, x) = −λIe(x, z),
and the affirmation is proved.
• A strong (weak) variational trap x∗ ∈ Ω is such that, given a worthwhile to change process {xk}
converging to x∗, we have:
i) ∆λk+1,ek(x
k, xk+1) = A(xk, xk+1)− λk+1Iek(x
k, xk+1) ≥ 0, k ∈ N;
ii) ∆λ∗,e∗(x
∗, y) = A(x∗, y)− λ∗Ie∗(x∗, y) < 0, y 6= x∗.
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5.6 The Case of an Hadamard Manifold
• The consideration of regeneration of resources constaints. As said before, the context of
Hadamard manifolds is fundamental for the consideration of dynamic problems. It allows to consider
regeneration of resource constraints, which are almost always neglected in dynamic models, where the
state space is an Euclidian space.
• The modelization of inconvenients to change. The main “variational rational” concept whose
formulation changes when the space of actions moves from M = Rn to an Hadamard manifold is the
inconvenient to change function Ie(z, y) = Ce(z, y)− Ce(z, z) which passes from
Ie(z, y) = Ce(z, y)− Ce(z, z) = 〈z − x, y − z〉 to Ie(z, y) = 〈exp
−1
z x, exp
−1
z y〉.
The interpretation is exactly the same as before and needs not to be repeated because (see Proposi-
tion 2.1) the comparison theorem for triangles establishes a diffeomorphism between a geodesic trian-
gle ∆(x, y, z) on the Hadamard manifold and a corresponding one, ∆(x′, y′, z′) in the Euclidian space
E = Rn. Then, 〈exp−1z x, exp
−1
z y〉 = d(x, z)d(y, z) cosα. As before costs to be able to change depend
of geodesic distances.
• The variational trap problem.
We only need to verify that, moving from a weak stationary trap to a new one, is a worthwhile change.
Then, the Euclidian versions of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 show that limits of a succession of worthwhile
changes
{
xk
}
from a weak stationary trap xk ∈ J
Ak−1
λk
(xk−2) to the next xk+1 ∈ JAkλk+1(x
k−1) converges
towards an equilibrium x∗ ∈ Ω.
The conditionality assumption (18) is a weak sharp minimum condition. It supposes that x∗ is a weak
variational trap, related to the new resistance to change function R(z, y) = distρ(x, S); see the next
paragraph.
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The resolvant Lemma shows that it is worthwhile to move from a weak variational trap to the next.
• Finite termination is a very important property for a model which wants to modelize human behavior
in a nice way, because, in the long run, we are dead! Convergence in infinity time is of no use to describe
a goal directed behavior who requires to hope to reach a goal in finite time.
5.7 The Variational Rationality Flavor of all the Hypothesis Done in this Paper.
Let us show that all the hypothesis made in this paper have a strong variational rationality flavor. The
variational rationality (VR) approach considers, among other basic concepts, advantages to change A(x, y)
from x to y. Losses to change from x to y, F (x, y), refer to the opposite, the losses to change from x to y
which is F (x, y) = −A(x, y). Within the (VR) approach, the equilibrium problem in a Riemannian context
is:
find x∗ ∈ Ω : A(x∗, y) ≤ 0, y ∈ Ω.
Then, an equilibrium x∗ ∈ Ω is such that there is no advantages to change (there is no gain to deviate from
x∗), or there are losses to change, moving from it to an other position. Definition 3.1 considers a loss function
F : Ω× Ω 7−→ R. This loss function F is said to be,
(1) monotone, iff F (x, y) + F (y, x) ≤ 0 for all x, y ∈ Ω, i.e A(x, y) + A(y, x) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ Ω. This
means that, moving from x to y and coming back, cannot generate a global loss to change along this
cycle (in term of advantage to change). Notice that costs to be able to change are excluded from the
very definition of advantages to change;
(2) pseudomonotone, iff for each (x, y) ∈ Ω×Ω, F (x, y) ≥ 0 implies F (y, x) ≤ 0, i.e., A(x, y) ≤ 0 implies
A(y, x) ≥ 0.This means that it is always advantageous to move from x to y or the reverse. This is a
no strong indecision hypothesis;
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(3) θ-undermonotone, iff there exists θ ≥ 0 such that
F (x, y) + F (y, x) ≤ θd(x, y)2
, i.e., A(x, y) + A(y, x) ≥ −θd(x, y)2, for all (x, y) ∈ Ω × Ω. This means that the global advantage to
change from x to y and to come back cannot be too low, the more actions x, y are similar, the less it
is. This is a low resistance to change hypothesis.
These three properties are trivially true in the separable and experience independent advantages to change
case, A(x, y) = g(y) − g(x) = f(x) − f(y), i.e F (x, y) = g(x) − g(y) = f(y) − f(x), where g and f are the
“to be increased” or ”to be decreased” payoff functions, for a single agent. In the general case F = −A
is pseudomonotone if, having an advantage to change from x to y, there is no advantage to change from y
to x. Consider now the case of interacting agents I playing a Nash non cooperative game (see [7]), where
the profile of their actions is x = (x1, x2, .., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ....xm). In this setting, player i ∈ I performs an
action xi ∈ Ki, while his rivals −i = (j 6= i) carry out the other actions x−i = (xj , j 6= i), and each player i
considers his unsatisfied need function fi(x1, x2, .., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ....xm) = fi(x).
Let F (x, y) = Σi∈I [fi(x1, x2, .., xi−1, yi, xi+1, ...., xm)− fi(x1, x2, .., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ....xm)] be the perceived
global loss function of the players, where each player is supposed to be able to only perceive what will be his
loss Li((xi, x−i), (yi, x−i)) = [fi(x1, x2, .., xi−1, yi, xi+1, ...., xm)− fi(x1, x2, .., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ....xm)] , if he is
the only agent to move from the profile of old actions (x1, x2, .., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ....xm) = (xi, x−i) to the new
profile of actions (x1, x2, .., xi−1, yi, xi+1, ....xm) = (yi, x−i), instead of choosing to stay there, at x = (xi, x−i),
given that he supposes that the other players repeat their old actions.
In regard to the assumptions H1, H2, H3 on the loss functions, we have
H1) F (x, x) = 0 for each x ∈ Ω means that there is no loss to stay;
H2) For every x ∈ Ω, y 7→ F (x, y) is convex and lower semicontinuous, i.e., the advantages to change
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function y 7−→ A(x, y) is concave and upper semicontinuous;
H3) For every y ∈ Ω, x 7→ F (x, y) is upper semicontinuous, i.e., the advantages to change x 7→ A(x, y) is
lower semicontinuous.
Lower (upper) and upper (lower) semicontinuity assumptions are natural regularity assumptions for loss
(gain) functions. Only convexity (concavity) of the loss (gain) function y 7→ F (x, y) needs some comments.
Given the past action x, A(x, y) = −F (x, y) is the gain to move from x to y. Concavity of A(x, ·) refers to
the traditional assumption of decreasing marginal gains (a standard saturation effect).
Consider now the remaining hypothesis. It is not easy to give a variational interpretation of Assump-
tion 3.1. However, let us notice that when F is pseudomonotone, Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Then, for
an interpretation, we will refer to pseudomonotonicity. Now, Assumption 3.2 means that any (unbounded)
sequence
{
zk
}
⊂ Ω whose distance to an initial position goes to infinity, have, in term of the (VR) approach,
an aspiration point such that, after some time k ≥ k0, there is an advantage to change from any zk to the
aspiration point x∗ (see Soubeyran [26], Flores et al. [51] and Luc and Soubeyran [52], for applications).
This aspiration point represents a desirable end for an unbounded sequence going to infinity. Its existence
means that for any trajectory which goes far away (to infinity), agents can hope to improve their current
situation. This is strongly related to the so called theory of hope (Snyder [53]).
The last hypothesis, given in Definition 4.2, consider well conditionned bifunctions. It supposes that
a non degenerated F is ρ-conditioned, i.e, that there exist positive number ρ > 0 and τ > 0 such that
−F (x, PS(x)) ≥ τdist
ρ(x, S), x ∈ Ω, where S = EP (F,Ω). This hypothesis is very natural within the
variational rationality context. It means that it is always worthwhile to change from any point x ∈ Ω to
the projection PS(x) of x on the subset S = EP (F,Ω) of equilibrium points. In this case, advantages to
change from x to PS(x) are A(x, PS(x)) = −F (x, PS(x)) and resistance to change is R(x, y) = D [dist(x, S)].
This supposes that any change from x ∈ Ω to PS(x) ∈ S = EP (F,Ω) is worthwhile, in a specific sense:
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A(x, PS(x)) ≥ τdist
ρ(x, S), for all x ∈ Ω.
5.8 Exact And Approximate Solutions: Reversing The Logic
In this Section 5, we have shown that the equilibrium problem, with a Tikhonov regularization term, on
an Hadamard manifold, is a particular and nice instance of a very general variational trap problem, which
appears in Behavioral Sciences in Psychology, Economics, Management Sciences, Game theory, Decision
theory, Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, Political Sciences.
The “variational rationality” approach (see [25, 26]) reverses the logic of what is an exact or inexact
(approximate) solution, taking the point of view of, either Behavioral Sciences or Mathematics. If we
interpret the famous Tikhonov perturbation term 〈z − x, y − z〉 of a pertubed Nash equilibrium problem as
a cosinus measure of dissimilarity of two vectors in an inner product space, and, then, as a dissimilarity cost
to change from one direction of change to an other one, then:
1) in Behavioral Sciences, the (VR) approach, where costs to be able to change play a major role and
modelize inertia, frictions and learning, the natural solutions of a perturbed Nash equilibrium problem
are variational traps, reachable, in a worthwhile way, as maximal elements of a relation of worthwhile
changes, not Nash equilibria, which ignore costs to be able to change (frictions), once you are there, at
the Nash equilibrium (where frictions are absent, but why?). The exact solutions become variational
traps. The justification is that they include costs to be able to change in their definition. The
approximate solutions become Nash equilibria which ignore costs to be able to change in their strict
definition;
2) in Mathematics, perturbed Nash equilibrium problems have been seen in the opposite way: variational
traps (as solutions of perturbed Nash equilibrium problems) are seen as approximate solutions of the
exact solutions of a Nash equilibrium problem, with a perturbation term.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a sufficient condition to obtain the existence of solutions of EP. We presented a
proximal algorithm for EP whose iterative process has been considered in [7, Theorem 4.10]. Our convergence
analysis is restricted to Hadamard manifold with null sectional curvature and extends the convergence result
presented in [7] to the case where the bifunction of EP is not necessarily monotone. We obtained a condition
on the bifunction that retrieves the notion of weak sharp minima, and we prove the finite termination of
any sequence generated from our iterative process. In particular, the finite termination result presented
in [19] is extended to minimization problems whose constrained set is not necessarily the whole manifold.
We also obtain a finite convergence result for the proximal point method in order to find singularities of
single valued monotone vector fields (see [22, 13] and, hence, for the variational inequality problem (see [23]).
We gave an application to a recent unifying approach of a lot of stability and change theories in Behavioral
Sciences, the “Variational rationality approach of human behavior”, where an equilibrium problem appears
to modelize how an agent can reach a final equilibrium, following a sequence of worthwhile changes and
temporary stays from a stationary trap to the next one. As future work, we intend to propose a approach
of the proximal point algorithm for equilibrium problems to case that M is an Hadamard manifold with
negative sectional curvature, also we intend to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the hypothesis
of our Theorem 4.3 to occur.
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